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SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNMENT
J . M . M ackenzie 
University of Lancaster
The granting of Responsible Government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 was 
perhaps one of the most extraordinary acts of the Imperial Government in 
the twentieth century. Winston Churchill, who had been Secretary of State 
for the Colonies at the crucial point in the negotiations, remarked in 1927 to 
a future Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Godfrey Huggins, ‘You had 
— how many did you say? — only 30 000 Europeans when I gave you 
your constitution; I still don’t know why I did it.’* If Churchill was retro­
spectively surprised, the Colonial Office had been even more doubtful at the 
prospect of handing over almost a million Blacks to thirty thousand Whites. 
As Sir Henry Lambert had minuted in 1919: ‘To give responsible government 
to 30 000 whites ruling a million blacks is not only without precedent, but the 
example of N atal. . .  right up to 1910 shows how great the difficulties would 
be.’* The question why the Colonial Office, on the eve of the Devonshire 
Declaration, was prepared to abdicate its responsibilities in this way is 
one that has never been adequately answered.
The Colonial Office had of course never had direct responsibility for 
the administration of Rhodesia. This had been delegated to the British South 
Africa Company (B.S.A. Co.) whose charter, so nearly lost after the Jameson 
Raid and the risings in Southern Rhodesia iq 1896-97, had survived longer 
than any of the African charters. Although the Rhodesian settlers had been 
represented in the negotiations leading to Union in South Africa in 1910, the 
Company’s charter had been renewed for a further ten years in 1914 with 
the concurrence of the settlers’ Legislative Council. The possibility of Res­
ponsible Government was specifically mentioned in the renewal of the 
charter, but nevertheless it was clear that the succeeding years were to be a 
period of jockeying for Southern Rhodesia. Imperial policy was for ultimate 
union of the territory with South Africa, and Botha and Smuts prepared to 
harvest what Cecil Rhodes had sown. The B.S.A. Co., however, concerned
' H. C. Hummel, ‘Sir Charles Coghlan: The Issues and Influences of the Consti­
tutional Struggle for Responsible Government, 1904-1924’ (Univ. of Rhodesia, Dep. 
of History, Henderson Seminar Paper No. 11, 1969), 47.
y.; t * Public Rectord] Off [ice, London], C.O. 417/616 (Colonial Office, Africa 
4 0 Uth, Original Correspondence), 7749, minute of Lambert, 17 Feb. 1919 on Buxton 
to.JUong, 14 Nov. 1918, quoted in R. Hyam, The Pailure of South African Expansion, 
l#WW948 (London, Macmillan, 1972), 49.
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with current expediency, appeared to equivocate. During the First World 
War, it sought the amalgamation of its territories straddling the Zambezi; 
yet pronouncements in favour of Union had frequently been made by its 
directors.
The whole issue ceased to be academic with the Privy Council judgment 
of 1918 on the protracted land case. The Privy Council ruled that the Com­
pany had administered the land of Rhodesia only as an agent of the Crown, 
and did not therefore possess, as it claimed, ownership of all unalienated 
land by right of conquest. The Privy Council added, however, that the Com­
pany had a right to claim compensation for its administrative deficits up to 
31 March 1918. This was significant in two ways. First, the Company ad­
ministration in Southern Rhodesia would no longer be prepared to incur 
administrative expenditure that would create further deficits after that date, 
and the ‘development’ of the country would be seriously retarded. Second, it 
meant that Southern Rhodesia had a price: whoever inherited the administra­
tion would have to pay the Company for its deficits. The amount of these 
deficits was decided by the Cave Commission, appointed in July 1919, which 
gave its award in January 1921. The manner of the disposal of the Southern 
Rhodesia inheritance was decided more quickly. The Buxton Committee 
which sat between March and April of 1921 recommended that the future 
should be decided by the settlers themselves by a device that has been rare 
and unpopular in British politics: the referendum.
The settlers, led by Charles Coghlan, secured Responsible Government 
via this referendum despite a considerable barrage of powers ranged against 
^them. Successive Secretaries of State, Bonar Law, Walter Long, Alfred Milner, 
and most of their permanent officials had regarded Responsible Government 
as unlikely and undesirable. Even Harcourt had been doubtful, and Church­
ill, having wavered in the direction of Responsible Government at the 
crucial moment in 1921, subsequently espoused the cause of Union. The 
B.S.A. Co. sought Union as the best way in which it could secure a good 
price for its recalcitrant offspring, and set about achieving its end by 
wielding its considerable power through financial interests in Johannesburg 
and London. Directors of the Company, and the Company Administrator in 
Rhodesia, had close personal relationships with Long, Milner, Churchill, and 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries Amery, Wood, and Ormsby-Gore,3 and
a Long and Milner were both correspondents of Drummond Chaplin, the Com­
pany’s Administrator in Southern Rhodesia; Milner was a friend ‘of fifty years 
standing of P. Lyttelton Gell, Director of the Company and later Acting President 
(they had been at Balliol together and later shared rooms in London); D. O. Malcolm, 
another Company Director and later President rejoiced when Wood became Parlia­
mentary Under-Secretary because Wood had been Malcolm’s ‘fag’ at Eton; Mal­
colm was also related by marriage to Ormsby-Gore; references to cosy after-dinner 
conversations with the politicians about the future of Rhodesia abound in the Direc­
tors’ correspondence.
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frequently imagined that they could influence the Colonial Office in conse­
quence. They had no illusions, however, about the antipathy the Company 
aroused among the permanent officials or about the power these officials 
exerted over their Secretaries of State.4 Coghlan recognized the power of 
capital when he described the enemies of Responsible Government as being 
‘the reptile press, the influence of the Chartered Company, the machinations 
of the non-Rhodesian capitalists and politicians with their local satellites’.® 
So much is well known, but students of the Responsible Government 
issue have never fully expained how Coghlan and his supporters won the 
principle of the referendum, and then that referendum itself, against such 
a formidable array of opponents. The crucial aspect which has been missed 
by all previous commentators is the influence of the Imperial ‘man on the 
spot’. The influence of the ‘man on the spot’ is an abiding theme of the 
historiography of nineteenth-century imperialism. But if the activities of the 
*man on the spot’ were crucial in the expansion of Empire, they were no 
less crucial — in the case of Southern Rhodesia at least — in constitu­
tional change leading to its contraction in the twentieth century. Those 
who have written on Responsible Government — and much of their 
work has remained unpublished — have taken either a metropolitan ap­
proach or a peripheral approach. Those in the former category, like Fage, 
Chanock, and Hyam, have examined mainly Imperial policy;® those in the 
latter, like Gann, Davies, and Hummel, primarily local politics.7 To a large 
extent this reflects whether the Imperial or Southern Rhodesian archives 
were used. Only Warhurst® used both, but his work is limited by a touch 
of Responsible Government nationalism, in which the Responsible Govern­
ment party are doughty fighters who succeeded in bamboozling a weak and 
vacillating Colonial Office, an utterly unscrupulous Company, and ‘slim
* National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury [unless otherwise indicated all 
documentary references are to these Archives], Historical] M[anu]s[cript]s Coll[ecdo]n, 
GH8/2 [Papers of Sir Francis Percy Drummond Chaplin: Correspondence], 2/2 (By 
Correspondent: Sir Henry Birchenough, 26 June 1951-21 Mar. 1929), Birchenough to 
Chaplin, 10 Nov. 1921: ‘the successive secretaries of state, Milner excepted, seemed 
usually content to leave matters to their officials’, ibid., CH8/2/1 [General, 9 Feb. 
1896-18 Nov. 1933], Chaplin to Sir John Chancellor, 1 Nov. 1923.
5 M. A. G. Davies, ‘Incorporation in the Union of South Africa or Self-Govern­
ment: Southern Rhodesia’s Choice, 1922’ (Univ. of South Africa, unpubl. M.A. thesis, 
, 1963).
' " « J. D. Fage, ‘The Achievement of Self-Government in Southern Rhodesia, 1898- 
■dj923’ (Univ. of Cambridge, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1949); M. L. Chanock, ‘British 
"■’'Policy in Central Africa, 1908-1926’ (Univ. of Cambridge, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1968), 
JSnce published in a considerably amended form as Unconsummated Union: Britain, 
Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-45 (Manchester, Manchester Umv. Press, 1977), which 
he describes as ‘an “official mind” study of the period’ (p.6); R. Hyam, The Failure 
T>f South African Expansion, ch. 3.
• 7 L. H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia (London, Chatto and Windus, 
®1965),' 231-50; Davies, ‘Incorporation in the Union’; Hummel, ‘Sir Charles Coghlan’.
•-#5vK!,'*P* R- Warhurst, ‘Rhodesia and Her Neighbours, 1900-1923’ (Univ. of Oxford,
. 'Unpubl. D.Phil. thesis, 1970).
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Jannie’ Smuts, incidentally saving Southern Rhodesia for the Empire. None of 
these, except Warhurst, adequately examine the role of the Company, and all 
have missed the significance of the ‘man on the spot’.9 Moreover, there have 
been some significant misconceptions about the voting patterns in 1922. 
Arrighi described the victory of Responsible Government as the victory of 
‘domestic capital’.'0 Chanock has seen it as the victory of ‘petit-bourgeois 
nationalism’." In fact, one of the most significant Responsible Government 
elements was White labour, and domestic capital was seriously divided.
This paper will argue that the Colonial Office in its dealings with the 
Company was activated by a long tradition of hostility, and by a desire to 
avoid offence to the elected members in the Legislative Council which it had 
called into being to control that Company. It was this which encouraged the 
local official of the Colonial Office — the Resident Commissioner, established 
as an Imperial watchdog under the Order-in-Council of 1898 — to enter into 
an alliance with the Responsible Government Association and discover the 
constitutional formula which would salve the Colonial Office’s conscience. 
Moreover, Responsible Government became the liberal solution to the pro­
blem of Rhodesia, largely because Exeter Hall lent its support owing to its 
implacable hostility to the Company and its distrust of Union ‘native policy’. 
Finally, no less than in South Africa, Smuts was thwarted by the fatal division 
of the English-speaking Whites into capital and labour.
The Colonial Office’s attitudes towards the settlers were conditioned 
by the peculiarities of Company rule. From the Risings onwards, senior 
Colonial Office officials like Just, Anderson, Lambert, and to a lesser extent 
Fiddes, had led a chorus of hostile opinion to the Company.'2 In the absence 
of the revocation of the Charter in 1898, the Order-in-Council of that year 
set up a Legislative Council which was specifically designed to keep the 
Company in check, as well as answer the local demand for representation. 
This Legislative Council had subsequently pursued the classic pattern of 
development, from elected minority to elected majority. In 1898 there had 
been 4 elected and 5 nominated members. In 1903 parity was achieved with 
7 of each. In 1907 an elected majority was produced by the curious device 
of the Company’s voluntarily reducing the nominated element to 5. In 1913 
and 1917 the elected members were increased to 12 and 13 respectively.
» More recently, both Lord Blake and Chanock have noted the influence of 
Stanley, though only in passing, Chanock relegating his remark to an appendix: R. 
Blake, A History of Rhodesia (London, Eyre Methuen, 1977), 180; Chanock, Un­
consummated Union, 267.
<°G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia (The Hague, Mouton, 1967), 
29-30.
it Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 51.
i2 Just was Assistant Under-Secretary from 1907 to 1916; Anderson was Permanent 
Under-Secretary from 1916 to 1921; Lambert was Assistant Under-Secretary from 
1916 to 1921; Fiddes was Assistant Under-Secretary from 1909 to 1916 and Permanent 
Under-Secretary from 1916 to 1921.
J .  M. M ACKENZIE 2 7
In the face of this development of the elected element, the Colonial 
Office had found itself forced to adopt an anti-Company line whenever the 
Administration and the elected members came into conflict. As early as 
1902 one Colonial Office official had minuted: ‘It would not do for 
H.M.G. to take up a hostile attitude to a movement for increasing popular 
control as against that of the Company in Southern Rhodesia’.'3 Sir Lewis 
Harcourt had written that H.M.G. had ‘felt throughout that their decision 
must be largely influenced by the opinions of the electors of Southern Rho­
desia, who are the persons primarily interested in the form of administra­
tion insofar as that part of the Company’s territories is concerned’.'4 Again 
in 1917 Lambert had commented that the difficult situation of Company rule 
facing an elected majority was only workable through the presence of the 
Crown, and that in consequence the Crown should never side with the 
Company against the elected members as it would make the position 
impossible should chartered rule end.13 Even Walter Long, in a private letter 
to Chaplin, the Company Administrator in Southern Rhodesia, apologized 
for the refusal of the Company’s amalgamation schemes on the grounds that 
the Colonial Office could not act against ‘popular’ opinion.'6 In this way, 
the Colonial Office liad itself created, like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, a force 
it could no longer control.
Yet it cannot be argued that Responsible Government was in conse­
quence inevitable. Although the Supplemental Charter of 1914 had alluded 
to it as the alternative to Chartered rule, this was seen purely as a prelude 
to Union in the same way that Responsible Government in the Transvaal 
from 1907 had been. Moreover, Harcourt had himself qualified this on several 
occasions; in a much-quoted letter of 1911 he had written that in any dead­
lock between the Company and the settlers, Southern Rhodesia must enter 
the Union.'7 In 1913 he had written that ‘one would imagine that Union is 
their proper ultimate objective’.'8 Moreover, his Tory successors had regarded 
Responsible Government as ‘totally out of the question’.'9 In July 1919, 
Milner in a telegram to Buxton pointed out that the Supplemental Charter 
allowed for Responsible Government if conditions warranted it, but that
is Public Rec. Off., G.O. 417/345, 48597, minute of Grindle, 24 Nov. 1902.
M Harcourt to Gladstone, 3 Oct. 1914, quoted in C. Palley, The Constitutional 
History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966), 
205.
is Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/589, 46457, minute of Lambert, 17 Oct. 1917 on 
Buxton to Long (confidential), 13 Aug. 1917.
is Hist. Mss Colin, O H 8/2/2/8 [By Correspondent: W. H. Long, 22 Mar. 1909- 
10 Mar. 1918], Long to Chaplin, 28 Dec. 1917.
" ■  w IT he] Ilhodiesia] Her[ald], 24 Dec. 1913, a report of a speech of Jameson, 
quoting Harcourt. See also J. P. R. Wallis, One Man’s Hand (London, Longmans 
Green, 1950), 129.
i 18 Hyam The Failure of South African Expansion, 49.
)i-. ** The phrase is Milner’s: Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/616, 7749, minute 22 April 
1919 on Buxton to Long, 14 Nov. 1918.
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Milner felt that they did not.20 One of the principal Rhodesian Unionists, 
Sir Bourchier Wrey (a cousin of Walter Long) was assured by Lambert in 
August 1919 that the Colonial Office favoured the junction of Southern Rho­
desia with the Union, and Wrey returned to Rhodesia convinced that ‘res­
ponsible government is I am glad to see doomed’.2'
In that same month of August, however, Sir Henry Lambert indulged 
in a vital volte face. Minuting upon a telegram from Buxton to Milner which 
indicated that the Rhodesian public would not accept Union, Lambert re­
viewed the alternatives and came to the conclusion that Responsible Govern­
ment carried fewer difficulties than the other possible courses.22 This con­
version of Lambert was to be crucial, for he was to become the greatest 
protagonist of Responsible Government within the Colonial Office. He pre­
pared and sat on the first Buxton Committee, whose terms of reference 
assumed Responsible Government from the outset. When Churchill power­
fully espoused Union, he recognized that Lambert was the greatest stumbling 
block in the Colonial Office, wrote to him twice in September 192123 to make 
it clear that Union was now the policy, and transferred him to the Crown 
Agents later in the same year. The even more crucial conversion of Milner 
took place in the following year, September 1920, when he wrote: ‘I am 
beginning to come round to the idea, that we shall have to give Rhodesia 
some form of self-government sooner than I at one time contemplated or at 
all like.’24 Milner’s conversion had come after the Rhodesian elections of 
April 1920, when the Responsible Government party had shown its strength, 
but it is significant that he wrote the above as comment upon a despatch 
of the High Commissioner, Buxton, enclosing a memorandum from the ex- 
Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia, now Imperial Secretary at the Cape, 
Herbert Stanley.25 The very considerable influence of Stanley, for whom 
Buxton was little more than a stalking horse, has been largely ignored in 
studies of the Responsible Government issue.
Lord Buxton, High Commissioner in South Africa, was not highly re­
garded in the Colonial Office, mainly because he had more than once caused 
the Office considerable embarrassment. In 1916 during the debate on the
2° Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/619, 39043, telegram Milner to Buxton, 1 July 1919.
21 Ibid., C.O. 417/620, 47156, Wrey to Lambert, 19 Aug. 1919.
2 2  Ibid., C.O. 417/620, 45008, minute of Lambert, 6 Aug. 1919 on telegram Buxton 
to Milner, 1 Aug. 1919.
23 Warhurst, ‘Rhodesia and Her Neighbours?, 358.
2 4  Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/640, 41929, minute of Milner, 18 Aug. 1920, on 
Buxton to Milner, 6 Aug. 1920.
2 5 Ibid., C.O. 417/640, 41929, Buxton to Milner, 6 Aug. 1920, enclosing a memo­
randum in which Stanley had argued that Representative Government or Responsible 
Government would be preparation for union, that Responsible Government would be 
preferable, and suggested for the first time the idea that the High Commissioner could 
still reserve ‘native affairs’. Leopold Amery in a minute of 4 Aug. 1919 (C.O. 417/619, 
41726, on Buxton to Milner, 24 June 1919) had suggested Representative Government 
or ‘some variant on diarchic lines’.
J .  M. M ACKENZIE 2 9
Company’s plans to amalgamate Northern and Southern Rhodesia, he had 
announced in Salisbury that the Company could have amalgamation provided 
the settlers approved, as no Imperial interest was involved.26 The Colonial 
Office felt that he had not only been indiscreet, but had failed to recognize 
the reality of Imperial interest, and in consequence he was rebuked by Bonar 
Law.27 In 1919 he had produced an uproar when he privately encouraged 
the Responsible Government leaders, after Milner’s despatch in August, 
which set out to discourage hopes of Responsible Government, by informing 
them that this despatch represented Milner’s personal view and not that of 
H.M.G.28 He had thus shown a degree of partisanship, and it was largely 
under the influence of Herbert Stanley.
After several indolent Resident Commissioners in Salisbury, Stanley had 
annoyed the Company by his activities,29 and had impressed the Colonial 
Office by his very full despatches on, inter alia, Northern Rhodesian labour, 
the amalgamation issue, and, later, Responsible Government. Unknown to 
the Colonial Office, however, he had become firmly convinced of the need 
for Responsible Government, and from 1917 had been closely associated 
with the Responsible Government party. He was regarded by one Company 
director as ‘our sinister friend Stanley’.30 He was related by marriage to 
Newton, ex-colonial official, the Treasurer in the Company’s Administration, 
and later a leading Responsible Government politician; he had frequent 
secret meetings with Coghlan and Newton;31 and probably precipitated
*« Ibid., C.O. 417/576, 37180, Buxton to Bonar Law, 19 July 1916, and minute 
of Lambert, 23 Aug. 1916, on the same, commenting that Buxton seemed to ignore 
the Black population. Buxton thought that amalgamation and union were not in­
compatible.
2 7  Ibid., in answer to the above, Lambert was still remembering Buxton’s mistake 
in November, C.O. 417/590, 53496, minute of Lambert, 14 Nov. 1917 on Buxton to 
Long, 21 Sept. 1917.
aa Rhod. Her., 27 Apr. 1920. Newton informed Chaplin that he had been told that 
Buxton had given a great deal of encouragement to the Responsible Government mem­
bers in Bulawayo, and had told them to return to the attack, Hist Mss Colin, C H 8/2 /2 / 
14 [By Correspondent: F. J. Newton, 19 Mar. 1916-30 May 1920], Newton to Chaplin, 
31 Oct. 1919. Chaplin suggested that if Milner’s August despatch had been allowed 
to stand without Buxton’s gloss, Responsible Government would never have been a live 
issue, ibid., CH 8/2/2/13 [By Correspondent: Viscount Milner, 22 Apr. 1906-28 May 
1921], Chaplin to Milner, 6 May 1920.
2 9  Hist. Mss Colin, CH 8/2/2/12 [By Correspondent: Sir Lewis Michell, 4 Apr. 
1914-5 June 1923], Chaplin to Michell, 21 Jan. and 7 Mar. 1918. Malcolm had once 
referred to ‘James Fair’s method, complete indolence’, ibid., CH 8/2/2/1/11 [By 
Correspondent: D. O. Malcolm, 16 Sept. 1910-9 Apr. 1929], Malcolm to Chaplin, 
6 Feb. 1915. A crucial moment for the reactivation of the Resident Commissionership. 
and as it turned out for the path to Responsible Government, was when the offices of 
Resident Commissioner and Commandant General of the British South Africa Police were 
separated in 1913. This opened the way to civilian Resident Commissioners, of whom 
Stanley was the first.
so Ibid., CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 6 Sept. 1921.
3'  Hist. Mss Colin, C 08 /1 /3  [Papers of Sir Charles Patrick John Coghlan: Corres­
pondence: Personal], Coghlan to Lady Coghlan, 13 Oct. 1921: ‘Stanley says it must 
not be known he had seen me’. Hist. Mss. Colin, NE1/1/1 [Papers of Sir Francis James 
Newton : Correspondence: Sir Charles Coghlan, 13 Nov. 1922-24 Aug. 1927], Newton 
to Coghlan, 16 Nov. 1922.
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Newton’s entry into the Responsible Government party by showing him a 
copy of the Buxton Report before it was published.32 His influence upon Bux­
ton is incontrovertible, and when Buxton was succeeded by Prince Arthur of 
Connaught in 1920, Stanley became the effective power in Cape Town and 
Pretoria, Prince Arthur being Smuts’s ideal of a figurehead and non-interfering 
High Commissioner. Finally, it was Stanley who solved the problem of the 
Colonial Office’s conscience about handing over one million Blacks to 30 000 
Whites by suggesting that Responsible Government be limited by vesting 
‘native affairs’ in the High Commissioner.33 It was a cunning device, for it 
could be all things to all men. To the Unionists in Rhodesia it was seen as 
rendering Responsible Government nugatory, while there were those, in­
cluding Churchill and Devonshire’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ormsby- 
Gore,34 35who recognized that it would be a dead letter. But Buxton accepted 
all of Stanley’s recommendations and embodied them in his important des­
patch of 6 August 1920 and later in the first Buxton Report, which the Com­
pany rightly saw as haying! been heavily influenced by Stanley despite the 
fact that he was not a member of the Committee.33
When Smuts, following his tour of Rhodesia in 1922, requested that 
the Imperial Government give a lead in favour of Union to the Southern 
Rhodesian electorate, it was Stanley, in the absence of Prince Arthur, who 
counselled against such a move.33 Meanwhile, Stanley’s successor as Resident 
Commissioner in Rhodesia was Douglas-Jones, who had been secretary to all 
the Resident Commissioners since 1898 and was rewarded with the Resident 
Commissionership itself in 1918. As a long-standing Salisbury resident, whose 
brother was a Responsible Government member of the Legislative Council 
from 1920, Douglas-Jones was also inclined to the Responsible Government 
interest, and was considerably influenced by Stanley, his former chief. The 
Company may well have been right in suspecting that Stanley’s motivation 
was to pull the plum of the governorship out the Responsible Government 
pie.37 It would have been a just reward for Stanley’s close and secret rela- 
toinship with the Responsible Government leaders and his considerable 
efforts on their behalf. It is interesting to note that when the Colonial Office 
informally offered him the governorship of Northern Rhodesia, he informed
3 2  Hist. Mss Colin, CH 8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 7 June 1921.
3 3  See above, n.25. I  can find no earlier reference in the official papers to the idea 
of limited Responsible Government than Stanley’s constitutional memorandum.
3 4  Ormsby-Gore questioning Wood in the Commons on 21 July 1921 said that 
experience in Natal showed that safeguards on native affairs were nugatory, 144 H. C. 
Debates, 5th ser., 2386.
35 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 31 Mar., 28 Apr. and 7 
June 1921. ‘Both reports . . are due to our sinister friend Stanley, who seems to be 
the villain of the piece’, ibid., CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 6 Sept. 1921.
36 Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/681, 44403, Stanley to Masterton-Smith, 14 Aug.
1922.
3v Hist. Mss Colin, CH 8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 7 June 1921.
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them that his ambition did not lie in Livingstone.38 When the Southern Rho­
desian governorship had gone elsewhere, however, he did indeed go to 
Livingstone as the beginning of a distinguished gubernatorial career that 
would eventually take him back to Salisbury.39
While the ‘men on the spot’ were thus assiduously working for Res­
ponsible Government, it was Churchill, who succeeded Milner in Fehruary 
1921, who vacillated at the crucial moment and virtually ensured success for 
Responsible Government. In appointing the Buxton Committee,40 With 
Buxton and Lambert as its leading members, he could have been in little 
doubt as to the recommendations of that committee, particularly as the terms 
of reference assumed that Responsible Government would be the likely out­
come. Later, under the influence of Smuts, Churchill was to become an eager 
supporter of Union for Southern Rhodesia. Whereas Milner had been cautious 
and anxious to avoid extra expenditure for the Imperial taxpayer, Churchill 
was mercurial, so mercurial in fact that he thoroughly confused the Company 
directors.41 He seemed to have sold the pass to Responsible Government in 
a moment of haste before his departure for Egypt; yet later he became, the 
fiercest supporter of Union.42 Churchill had in fact speeded up the whole 
process. Whereas Milner had thought in terms of waiting for fresh immigra­
tion to Rhodesia, waiting for the next general election due in Southern Rho­
desia in 1924, and then testing the outcome, Churchill accepted the idea of 
a referendum,43 pressed for a Rhodesian all-party delegation to meet Smuts, 
for Smuts’s Union terms to be considered in Rhodesia and for both the Res­
ponsible Government and the Union terms to appear on the referendum ballot 
paper. But while the Colonial Office abdicated responsibility to Southern 
Rhodesian ‘popular’ opinion, which of course meant White settler opinion, 
the Cabinet was deluded into imagining that Imperial policy for Union, 
which was also the cheapest policy of course, could be successfully achieved. 
In June 1920 Milner had suppressed a Colonial Office memorandum for the
4s C.O. 417/694, 40787, Stanley to Masterton-Smith, 15 Aug. 1923.
■ 3 9  Herbert J. Stanley was Resident Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia, 1915-18; 
Imperial Secretary, South Africa, 1918-24; knighted in 1924; Governor, Northern Rho­
desia, 1924-7; Governor, Ceylon, 1927-31; High Commissioner in South Africa, 1931-5; 
and Governor, Southern Rhodesia, 1935-42.
ao Great Britain, First Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider Certain 
Questions Relating to Rhodesia [Cmd 1273; Chairman: Lord Buxton], (H.C. 1921, 
xiV; 719). The Buxton Committee, consisting of Sir Henry Lambert, R. N. Greenwood, 
Sir Edward Grigg, and W. Waring, M.P., must hold the record as the most expeditious 
of all Government Commissions. Appointed by Churchill within two weeks of his 
coming to office, on 7 March 1921, just before he departed for Egypt, it presented its 
report on 12 April 1921.
‘Churchill’s attitude is puzzling’; and ‘Winston is so mercurial we don't know 
what he is going to do next’; Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 1 Dec. 
1921, and Michell to Chaplin, 18 Dec. 1921.
4 2  Hist. Mss Colin, C 08 /1 /3 , Coghlan to Lady Coghlan, 17 Nov. 1921.
4 3  The idea of the referendum was first suggested by the Colonial Office official, 
Davis, Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/620, 7927, minute of Davis, 17 Feb. 1921.
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Cabinet because it was in favour of Responsible Government. By October 
1921, Churchill wps explicitly working for Union in the Cabinet.44
But if Churchill appeared inconsistent, the Company had been no less 
so. Like the Colonial Office, it had exhibited indecision as to whether South 
Africa should end at the Limpopo or the Zambezi. In 1914, during the agita­
tion regarding the renewal of the Charter, the Company, and in particular 
Jameson, had used the possibility of Union as a bogey with which to frighten 
the Southern Rhodesian electors.45 In 1916, the Company had again appeared 
to set its face against Union when it had sought the amalgamation of North­
ern and Southern Rhodesia. At that time, Jameson had specifically said that 
amalgamation would postpone Union, but by 1917 he was telling the Com­
pany shareholders that Union would produce the best settlement for the 
Company.46 When this produced a storm of protest among the settlers, he 
suggested that there might be an interim period of Responsible Government.47
Nonetheless, events of the War had led the Company at times to espouse 
the notion of a great Central African territory. It was Company forces which 
seized the Caprivi Strip, and the High Commissioner dangled before the 
Company the possibility of involvement in the post-war settlement. With 
the Germans defeated in South West Africa and in German East Africa, 
there was the possibility of a redistribution of territory, and Charter hoped 
to secure some of the pickings. Drummond Chaplin, the Administrator in 
Rhodesia, as scornful of the Portuguese as many other Southern African 
politicians had been, wrote that the Portuguese had been so inefficient in 
permitting the Germans to reach Portuguese supply dumps, thereby pro­
longing the campaign against von Lettow Vorbeck, that they could only ex­
pect to lose some of their territory after the War.48 Louremjo Marques could 
go to South Africa; Beira, the Zambezi Valley and the Shire Highlands to 
Rhodesia; and Portugal could receive some compensation in German East 
Africa. The Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, expressed not a little interest
44 ‘Mr. Churchill having1 pointed out that we could not wel} compete with the 
inducements which were being offered by General Smuts, proposed to continue the 
discussion with bias a little in favour of joining Union,. This was the conclusion at a 
Cabinet held in October 1921, quoted in Warhurst, ‘Rhodesia and Her Neighbours’, 363.
as Rhod. Her., 24 Dec. 1913.
« The British South Africa Company, Report of the Twenty-First Ordinary 
General Meeting,... 5 July, 1917 (London, The Company, 1917), 6.
4? Rhod. Her., 20 July 1917, quoted in Warhurst, ‘Rhodesia and her Neighbours’, 
288. Warhurst suggests that the Company had plotted Union from the time of dis­
cussions between Botha and the Company in 1910 and the secret memorandum of 1911 
compiled by Wilson Fox, the Company’s Manager, and that they even saw amalgamation 
as strengthening their hand for union. A reading of the Company correspondence 
makes it difficult to believe that the Company was so consistent as to have such a 
‘plot’. Jameson .argued for amalgamation on the grounds that it would prevent Union, 
Hist. Mss Colin, CH 8/2/2/12, Michell to Chaplin, 11 Feb. 1915; Malcolm had also 
indicated that amalgamation would make entry to Union more difficult, and that it 
would in consequence be opposed by the ‘Union element’ in Southern Rhodesia; ibid., 
CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 12 Oct. 1915.
as Hist. Mss Colin, C H 8/2/2/8, Chaplin to Long, 11 Feb. 1917; Long to Chaplin, 
4 Sept. 1917; and Chaplin to Long, 10 Mar. 1918.
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in these proposals.. Yet they only served to make the Colonial Office’s dilem­
ma, and the pivotal position of Rhodesia, more apparent.
The significance of amalgamation and the wild schemes associated with 
it is that during the War the Company was clearly looking northwards. In the 
Colonial Office, the Company’s amalgamation plans of 1916 were regarded 
as essentially anti-Union and therefore unacceptable. Sir John Anderson 
minuted with great prescience that German South West Africa would almost 
certainly be added to the Union after the War, providing strength for those 
opposed to Botha and Smuts, and making it essential that Southern Rhodesia 
be used as a counterpoise.49 So the Company’s amalgamation plans were 
thwarted, both by the Colonial Office ruling in the tradition of Lord Salisbury 
that Southern Africa — and symbolically Roman Dutch law — ended at the 
Zambezi, and by Colonial Office support for the elected members who feared 
dilution of their tiny White minority by the overwhelmingly Black north. 
In 1917 the Company attempted to achieve amalgamation ‘through the 
back door’ by uniting the administratorships of Northern and Southern Rho­
desia. This again was refused. Until 1918 at least, elements in the Company 
remained anti-Union. In that year Newton, then Acting Administrator (who 
alone of all the Company officials remained consistent50) warned against 
Union, much to the annoyance of the Colonial Office, who thought that he 
had spoken under Company orders.5’
The Company had ironically already become turbulent for Union by the 
time that they suceeded in achieving their diluted version of amalgamation, 
the joining of the administratorships of Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
under Chaplin, in 1921. While the Union had in the past been a convenient 
bogey for the continuation of the Charter, the Union now became the most 
eager buyer with the fattest purse. The Cave Commission had asserted the 
Company’s right to be reimbursed for its administrative deficits to the tune 
of almost £5 million, a figure with which the Company was not displeased, 
‘knowing how arbitrators work in these matters’.52 Moreover, the Company 
felt that it was an amount which Smuts could afford to pay. But the Buxton 
Committee suggested that this amount could be paid out of land sales, a 
prospect which convinced the Company that it would have to wait a hundred 
years to be paid off. In the event the Company was of course right in assuming 
that South Africa would be the most liberal buyer, for Smuts was prepared *•
*• Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/574, 7706, minute of Anderson on Buxton to Bonar 
Law, 25 Jan. 1916.
so Sir Francis Newton had been Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland at the 
time of the Jameson Raid, and had been piqued not to succeed Milton as Administrator 
of Southern Rhodesia. In 1916 Newton wrote to Chaplin that he found that the Na­
tionalists and Labour reduced the dignity of the South African House — ‘My only 
prayer is that we may be kept out of it as long as possible’, Hist. Mss Colin, CH 8/2/2/14, 
Newton to Chaplin, 22 June 1916.
si Rhod. Her., 9 Mar. 1918; Public Rec. Off., C.O. 417/602, 21516, minutes on 
Ruxton to Long, 26 Mar. 1918.
5 2  Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 20 Jan. 1921.
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not only to pay out the Company for its administrative deficits and its assets 
at once, but was also willing to take over the Company’s railway rights and 
negotiate for the mineral rights. It is perhaps not surprising that the Company 
discovered that Imperial interests lay not in the creation of a great Central 
African territory —■ as they had appeared to argue in the past — but in a 
greater South Africa. The Company and its related financial interests there­
fore encouraged the Rhodesian Union Association by financing it with 
amounts far in excess of the Responsible Government Association’s finances.?3
After the referendum of October 1922, in which the Responsible Gov­
ernment Association won a victory of 8 774 votes to Union’s 5 989, the 
Responsible Government party were convinced that Ormsby-Gore, who was 
virtually running the Colonial Office for Devonshire, was holding up 
the final settlement because he was ‘hand in glove’ with the Com­
pany.64 Coghlan wrote that Ormsby-Gore had told Harris (the Res­
ponsible Government representative in London) that the situation was ‘ob­
scure and difficult’ when the Responsible Government people knew that it 
was ‘simplicity itself’.53 45 Coghlan was of course exaggerating, for in the ab­
sence of Smuts’s down-payment to the Company, the Company had decided 
to proceed by Petition of Right to secure an immediate cash settlement of its 
administrative deficits under the Cave Award. The final irony in the Com­
pany’s fortunes was that in early 1923 Rochfort Maguire became President 
of the Company: he was pro-Responsible Government and anti-Union, perhaps 
echoing his Irish nationalist past.56 The ‘obscure and difficult’ situation was 
solved when the Colonial Office came to an agreement with the Company 
by which the Company received £3,75 million (£2 million from Southern 
Rhodesia and £1,75 million from the long-suffering Imperial taxpayer) in 
exchange for the waiving of the Imperial Government’s claims for war ex­
penses against the Company. The way was now cleared for the issue of the 
Letters Patent containing the Southern Rhodesian constitution. Despite all 
its fears, the Company came out of the settlement extremely well. It retained 
all its mineral rights in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, several million acres 
of land in both countries, a half-share in land sales in North-Western 
Rhodesia for forty years, and an 86 per cent share of Rhodesia Railways. Be­
tween 1924 and 1939 the Company paid out £8 million in dividends at the 
rate of 8 per cent per annum.57
The success of the Responsible Government party was the more re­
markable for being based on a very brief history. A Responsible Government
53 Hummel, ‘Sir Charles Coghlan’, 43. E. Tawse-Jollie, The Real Rhodesia (Lon­
don, Hutchinson, 1924), 87.
54 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 13 Feb. 1923.
55 Ibid, Coghlan to Newton, 17 Apr. 1923.
56 Hist. Mss Colin, C H 8/2/2/6 (By Correspondent: P. L. Gell, 24 Oct. 1918-6 
Jan. 1923), Gell to Chaplin, 30 Nov. 1922: ‘of course Maguire has always opposed 
Union.’
s7 Chanock, ‘British Policy in Central Africa’, 248; Unconsummated Union, 172.
movement had first been formed in 1912 before the review of the Charter 
due in 1914. Based on farming discontent with Company policy and the 
favouring of mineral interests, it failed to attract a more widespread support 
among the settler community. Re-formed in 1917 to oppose the Company’s 
amalgamation proposals, it received the greatest fillip from the Privy Council 
judgment in the land case. From now on Responsible Government was a 
viable proposition and the movement began to attract the support of local 
politicians like Coghlan and of important interest groups like commerce and 
labour.
Mrs Tawse-Jollie, the widow of the Company’s first Chief Magistrate 
(i.e. effectively Administrator) in Mashonaland, was a leading Responsible 
Government protagonist and ensured that almost the entire female vote 
went to Responsible Government, and stated as her reason for avoiding 
Union the fact that the English-speakers in South Africa had become fatally 
divided into Capital and Labour.58 Yet in Rhodesia they were no less divided; 
If any single influence was vital in the shift of opinion from 1914 to 1922 it 
was that of labour. It was the artisan class combined with women and some 
of the professional classes which ensured the success of Responsible Govern­
ment. In the past, workers on the mines had been sufficiently under the in­
fluence of their employers to vote for mining representatives. With the 
labour turbulence of the War and the inflation and strikes which followed it, 
it was no longer possible for mine-workers to see their interests as coinciding 
with those of the mining interest. Moreover, as comparisons of the 1911 and 
1921 censuses show, the workers in the ‘industrial’ category were rapidly 
growing in numbers.59 An analysis of the voters rolls of 1922 by profes­
sion reveals that it was in those constituencies where mining and industrial 
workers were most highly Concentrated that Responsible Government received 
its biggest majorities.60 Other high majorities were in urban constituencies 
inhabited by civil servants, professional people and women.6' The workers
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88 Tawse-Jallie, The Real Rhodesia, 59.
as The census report of 1921 gave the following occupation breakdown: public 
services, 4 892; professions, 1 490; mining, 4 316; agriculture, 8 250; industries 3 395; 
commerce, 5 645; commercial services, 1 684; railways, 3 725. The 1911 census report 
had given only 2 255 in mining and 2 067 in agriculture. The artisan element in mining 
and industries taken together constitute in 1921 about 24 per cent of the population, 
almost as large a single group as agriculture. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the 
Direstor of Census regarding the Census Taken on 7th May. 1911 (Sessional Papers^ 
A,7, 1912) ; Report of the Director of Census regarding the European Census Taken 
on 3rd May, 1921 (Sessional Papers, A.13, 1922).
, *o Hartley, the most important mining area, had a Responsible Government major­
ity of 66,52 per cent, while Bulawayo South and Bulawayo District, both with high 
artisan populations, had 63,97 and 64,98 per cent respectively. For much more detailed 
figures and extensive analysis of voting patternsi, see M. Elaine Lee, ‘An analysis of 
the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922’, Rhodesian History (1977), VIII, 77-98; ‘Politics and 
Pressure Groups in S. Rhodesia, 1898-1923’ (Univ. of London, unpubl. Ph.D., 1974); 
and ‘The origins of the Responsible Government Movement’, Rhodesian History (1975), 
.VI, 33-52.
«i Bulawayo North and Salisbury Town had Responsible Government majorities 
of 67,93 and 63,81 per cent.
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were influenced by the fact that they earned wages 10 per cent higher than 
their counterparts in South Africa (which contrasted notably with the lower 
wages prevailing for Africans in Rhodesia), by their view of Smuts after the 
February-March 1922 ‘revolution’ on the Rand as the Bloody Jeffreys of 
South Africa, his ‘feet dripping with blood’,62 and by anxieties that their 
privileged position would deteriorate if there was an influx of Poor Whites 
from the South.63 After the brutal suppression of the Rand strikes, Chaplin 
himself wrote that ‘the Rand troubles have made responsible government 
in Rhodesia almost a certainty’.64
Civil servants were concerned mainly about bilingualism and about 
Union taxation of which Responsible Government propaganda made much 
play.65 Women had been enfranchised in Rhodesia in 1919 much to the 
distaste of the Company which even then had recognized that this ‘monstrous 
regiment of women’ (adding no less than 3 467 voters to the rolls) would be 
solidly for Responsible Government. The women were near-unanimous be­
cause women did not have the vote in the Union, because of their disgust 
for Poor Whites,66 and fears of Dutch and English languages mixing pro­
miscuously in the schools. When Smuts referred to Rhodesians as ‘little 
Jingoes’67 he was perhaps thinking principally of the women. The other 
group which supported Responsible Government was the smaller element in 
the commercial sector, which was concerned about Union taxation which 
would have borne heavily upon them, about the abolition of the ‘Rhodes 
clause’ (which gave preference to British goods imported into Southern Rho­
desia), and about the possibility of being swamped by large South African 
concerns.
The Responsible Government Association has often been seen as a 
farmers’ party, particularly as most of its early leaders were farmers, and 
as the principal beneficiaries of Responsible Government seemed ultimately 
to be farmers. But in fact the farming interest was very divided by 1922 with
sz J. W. Keller, in Rhodesia Railway Review (Apr. 1922).
63 Responsible Government Association propaganda made great play of the Poor 
White problem: for example ‘Sui Juris’, The Terms of Union: An Examination of their 
Provisions, reprinted from the Rhodesia Railway Review (Sept. 1922): ‘The idea of a 
swarm of these poor unfortunate creatures coming into Rhodesia and multiplying here 
with frightful rapidity . . .  is dreadful to contemplate.’
64 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/12/1, Crewe to Chaplin, 20 Mar. 1922.
«5 An R.G.A. poster gave figures showing that there were 855 individual income 
tax payers in Southern Rhodesiia, but that under Union there would be over 4 000. 
Examples of the benefits to companies were revealed in The Bulawayo Chronicle, 7 Oct. 
1922: Shamva Mine paid £78 433 in tax and royalties in 1921; under Union it would 
pay £48 725. Falcon Mine paid £30 591 in tax and royalties in 1921; under Union 
it would pay nothing. These figures cannot have carried much weight with Coghlan’s 
‘man in the street’.
66 Mrs Boddington, speaking at an R.G.A. meeting at Selukwe because Mrs Tawse- 
Jollie was indisposed, said that the Poor Whites in the Free State were ‘neither black 
nor white, but really worse than animals^ and in addition they were mentally deficient', 
The Bulawayo Chronicle, 10 Oct. 1922.
67 Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 67.
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the majority probably taking the Union side. In the 1920 election Afrikaner 
farmers had been instructed by the South African nationalists to vote for 
Responsible Government specifically to frustrate Smuts’s aims. But the trojan 
horse in the Responsible Government movement had been turned aside by 
the powerful anti-Afrikaner sentiments within the party. Maize farmers alone 
continued to support Responsible Government because they feared the 
swamping of Rhodesia with South African maize, made competitive by cheap 
railway rates from the south, and therefore stealing the lucrative Matabele- 
land market from the Mashonaland grower.68 Both the other two sectors of 
Rhodesian farming, beef and tobacco, were for Union, hoping for markets 
there in a time of depression in both commodities.69 One of the principal 
items of Nationalist anti-Smuts propaganda was that South African cattle 
farmers, predominantly Afrikaners of course, would have to compete with 
cheap Rhodesian beef.70 The tobacco interest hoped for the removal of a 
tariff designed to protect the nascent South African tobacco industry.
The other group which has erroneously been seen as supporting Res­
ponsible Government, and which constituted a significant proportion of the 
population, is-the railway men.71 In fact analysis of the voting at Bulawayo 
polling stations in the ‘railway suburbs’ reveals that the railwaymen were 
split, but that a majority voted for Union.72 Propaganda regarding the ad­
vantages of working for a larger operation, and improved opportunities for 
promotion seem to have outweighed fears of bilingualism and of compulsory 
movement to any part of the Union.73 Apart from the railwaymen, then, 
Coghlan was not too far wide of the mark when he remarked that in the 
face of all the powerful forces ranged against him all he could muster was 
the ‘man in the street’,74 meaning of course the White man. Another contem­
porary judgment seems to have been more accurate than later commentaries 
— the analysis of the referendum by Chaplin in a letter to Smuts. The most 
recent historian of Rhodesia, Blake, wrongly contradicts Chaplin on the 
question of the farmer vote.75
Coghlan did however have one other area of support, and it was a most
sa An important maize-growing area like Mazoe was heavily pro-Responsible Gov­
ernment, Lee, ‘An analysis of the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922’, 88-90.
66 Marandellas, an important tobacco area, was the only constituency to vote for 
Union. Cattle-ranching districts of the Victoria and Western constituencies were 
heavily for Union.
zo Davies, ‘Incorporation in the Union’, 43.
71 See above, n.59.
7 2  In the two ‘railway suburbs’ of Bulawayo, Raylton and Bulawayo South, there 
were pro-Union majorities.
73 J. H. Eakin, A Few Words to Railwaymen (Bulawayo, Rhodesia Union Associa­
tion, 1922). The R.U.A. was the only association to produce a pamphlet in Afrikaans 
with a long section on railways and a page showing how to vote, since the ballot paper 
would of course be in English.
7 4  Davies, ‘Incorporation in the Union’, 16.
76 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 188.
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curious one. This was Exeter Hall. The role of the Aborigines Protection and 
Anti-Slavery Society, and of missionaries, even as radical as A. S. Cripps,7® 
was important in giving Responsible Government an air of respectability in 
liberal circles. To a far greater degree than the Colonial Office, they were 
activated by hostility to the Company: it seemed that those who were enemies 
of the Company, like Coghlan and his supporters, must necessarily be their 
friends. They were impressed that a missionary, Hadfield, was a member 
of the Responsible Government party, and that he had suggested in an 
electoral address that the one million acres net removed from the Reserves 
by the Coryndon Reserves Commission of 1915 should be returned.76 7 78Two 
other Responsible Government men, J. McChlery and H. U. Moffat, a future 
Southern Rhodesia Premier, had close relations with the Society. The Society 
had apparently forgotten that Coghlan had been a prime mover in racially 
discriminatory legislation before the War, that his interest in Union in 1909 
had been to escape Imperial ‘native policy’, that he had attacked the High 
Commissioner Gladstone’s ‘negrophilism’ in the ‘black peril’ case of 1911, 
that he had associated himself with Chartered ‘native policy’ and had dis­
associated himself from 'J. H. Harris’s Chartered Millions, in the preface of 
which he had received laudatory reference.73 Exeter Hall’s policy arose from 
the knowledge that Crown Colony rule, which they would have preferred 
was impracticable, and from their antipathy to both the Company and Union 
‘native policy’.
Another aspect of Responsible Government’s ‘liberalism’ was the 
fashion in which it set out to court the Indian and Coloured vote. The Res­
ponsible Government Association assiduously held meetings for these sectors 
of the population,79 and it is interesting to note that far more Indian voters, 
giving their professions as ‘traders’ and even ‘hawkers’ appear on the voters 
rolls for 1922 than had appeared at any time before. It has even been sug­
gested that registering officers, themselves almost certainly for Responsible
76 The more radical Rhodesian missionaries favoured direct Imperial control, but 
they were convinced by J. H. Harris that Responsible Government was the only prac­
ticable poKcy, T. O. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia (London, Heine- 
mann, 1970), 89.
7 7  This is mentioned in a copy of a  letter from the Aborigines Protection Society 
to Milner, July 1920 in Hist. Mss Colin, MA15/1/1 (Papers of John McChlery: Corres­
pondence: 23 Nov. 1911-15 July 1929). See also ibid., NE1/1/1, Newton to Coghlan, 
14 Feb. 1923: ‘Saw our friend J. H. Harris of the A.P.S. — who is heart and soul 
with us’.
78 J. H. Harris, The Chartered Millions (London, Swarthmore Press, 1920). Newton 
at one point was induced to write to Coghlan to tell him to restrain Leggate, one of 
the R. G. members, at least until after the constitution was secured, from saying that the 
repeal of the High Commissioner’s reservation of African affairs would have to be one 
of the first acts after Responsible Government, H ist Mss Colin, N E l/1 /1 , Newton 
to Coghlan, 25 Jan. 1923.
7» For example, one reported in The Bulawayo Chronicle, 10 Oct. 1922, at which 
extraordinary promises were made.
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Government, were less scrupulous about the exercise of the literacy qualifica­
tion than they had been in the past.80 Although the Responsible Government 
Association did not specifically court African support, educated Africans de­
cided to adopt the line of J. H. Harris, that there was no chance of securing 
direct Imperial control, and that Responsible Government was far pre­
ferable to Union. The Rhodesian Bantu Voters’ Association was founded and 
Sought the support of two Responsible Government members of the Legisla­
tive Council, too late (1923) to participate in the referendum. African voters 
had decided to combine on Cape lines to protect their interest, but few pro­
bably had any illusions about the effectiveness of the Imperial reservation of 
‘native affairs’.8' This, however, was purely educated opinion. If African 
labour had had a voice, the African labouring class may have recognized that 
Union could bring considerable economic advantages. Higher wages were 
offered in South Africa and might have pushed Rhodesian wages up — one 
of the greatest fears of the Responsible Government party was that Rhodesia 
might lose its cheap African labour force with Union. Certainly Rhodesian 
Africans had been voting for Union with their feet for decades by migrating 
to the Rand and other centres of employment in South Africa.82
The policies of the Imperial Government and of Southern African capital 
coincided in Rhodesia just after the First World War as they had done sp 
often in the past. But their enormous combined power was shattered by ‘men 
on the spot’ who ensured that the decision would be in the hands of White 
‘popular’ opinion, and who found in the reservation of ‘native policy’ the 
solution to ease the Imperial conscience. The victory of Responsible Govern­
ment was not, however, the victory of domestic capital, as it has sometimes 
been described; it was essentially the victory of a populist coalition such as 
was to be welded again at the break-up of the Federation. Smuts himself dug 
the grave of his ‘United States of Southern Africa’ in 1922, and the memo­
ries of his actions against the Rand strikers were of course fresh in the minds 
of the Southern Rhodesian electorate. The British South Africa Company 
got its price, but not such a good one as it would have obtained from Smuts, 
and the British taxpayer had to foot a large part of the bill.
Moreover, Responsible Government was secured at a moment of 
Imperial exhaustion. The intractable problems of Egypt, Kenya and Ireland
so Private information from B. A. Kosmin; see also his ‘Ethnic groups and the 
qualified franchise in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1922’, Rhodesian History (1977), VIII, 
58-60.
si Ranger, The African Voice, 91.
8 2  R. G. A. propaganda made much of the fact that ‘voluntary1 recruitment, which 
Smuts assured Rhodesia in his terms would be the only form of recruitment permitted, 
would be just as effective in draining the country’s labour supply. In 1916 during the 
amalgamation controversy, Malcolm had written that ‘one of our chief anti-Union 
arguments is that with Union our labour supply would be exploited for the Rand’. 
Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 16 Jan. 1916; see also above, 
n.47.
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all bore in on the Colonial Office at the same time, producing a marked 
effect upon the efficiency and the health of its officials.88 The Rhodesian 
analogy with Ireland was frequently made. When the Company was still in 
its anti-Union phase, Hawksley, the Company solicitor, had said in 1914, 
‘God forbid . . . that we should have to say “Rhodesia will fight and Rho­
desia will be right” but if there is any attempt made to put this country 
under the heel of the Union of South Africa you will know what to do'.83 4 
George V, himself in favour of Union and a devotee of Smuts, remarked to 
Coghlan when the Responsible Government delegation met the King in 1921 
that he understood that Rhodesia was the Ulster of South Africa. Coghlan re­
plied that she was just as loyal — an ironical remark to come from a man 
of southern Irish Catholic origins.85 86
But perhaps the greatest irony of the whole Responsible Government 
issue was the fact that many of the protagonists, even among the victors, re­
garded it as a purely temporary expedient. Smuts was convinced that South­
ern Rhodesia would still have to come in at a less favourable time;88 Milner 
regarded eventual Union as still inevitable;87 89several people saw Coghlan 
as the first and last Premier of Southern Rhodesia. Even Mrs Tawse-follie 
considered that Southern Rhodesia might very well still go into Union, but 
that it would be at Rhodesia’s own request rather than precipitated by the 
Chartered Company.88 H. U. Moffat, later Premier, wrote in his notes for 
an interview with Ormsby-Gore that Responsible Government would pro­
duce a large British immigration and Union later. In his account of the inter­
view itself he acceded to Ormsby-Gore’s remark that once Smuts had a big 
majority, Rhodesia would be more willing to go in.89 Newton also asserted 
that Rhodesia would go into Union, but that it would be in six years rather 
than six months.90 But as we know from more recent history, prophecies of 
that nature are always dangerous in the case of Rhodesia. The break-up of 
the Federation, U.D.I., and the escalation of the guerrilla war on the Zambezi 
at last threw Rhodesia into the arms of a republican South Africa. And the 
latter has found it as embarrassing a baby as the Company and the Colonial 
Office once did, and no less eager to divest itself of responsibility for it.
83 For example, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir James Masterton-Smith, under­
went a prolonged period of ill-health which resulted in complete breakdown in 1924, 
burned out and retired at the age of 46.
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